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INTRODUCTION
This review of Erik Olin Wright’s Envisioning Real Utopias 
(2010) will focus on his understanding of ‘capitalism,’ his 
conception of worker cooperatives, and the general issues 
surrounding markets, the Left, and Marxism.
THE FUNDAMENTAL MYTH OF ‘CAPITALISM’
The disagreements run very deep—even to the very desig-
nation of “the system” to be changed, i.e., “capitalism,” and 
the system to replace it, i.e., “socialism.” 
So let’s start with Wright’s definition of “capitalism” as 
the target of his critique. 
In capitalism, the means of production are privately 
owned and the use of those means of production is 
controlled by those owners or their surrogates. The 
means of production by themselves, of course, can-
not produce anything; they have to be set in motion 
by human laboring activity of one sort or another. In 
capitalism, this labor is provided by worke0tralized 
voluntary exchange by privately contracting parties—
or what is generally called “free markets”—through 
which the prices and quantities of the goods and ser-
vices produced are determined…
The combination of these two features of capitalism—
class relations defined by private ownership and prop-
ertyless workers, and coordination organized through 
decentralized market exchanges—generates the char-
acteristic competitive drive for profits and capital ac-
cumulation of capitalist firms. (Wright, Envisioning 
Real Utopias, 2010, p. 22-3) [unless otherwise indi-
cated, all quotes are from the June 2009 version freely 
available on the internet and thus unencumbered by 
“capitalist intellectual property rights” (p. 232)]
Wright’s article in Jacobin (Online) (12.2.2015) was a bit 
more concise.
Capitalism as a way of organizing economic activity 
has three critical components: private ownership of 
capital; production for the market for the purpose of 
making profits; and employment of workers who do 
not own the means of production.
Thus attacking “capitalism” is assumed to involve attack-
ing: (1) “private ownership of capital” or more broadly in 
Marxism, the private property system, (2) “coordination 
organized through decentralized market exchanges”, and 
(3) “employment of workers who do not own the means of 
production.” The alternative of “democratic egalitarian so-
cialism” would thus negate these three features.1
In attacking “private ownership of capital” or “private 
ownership of the means of production,” it behooves the 
critics to at least understand those legal notions in the “cap-
italist” system (also a misnomer; see below). The concept is 
inherited straight from Marx whose notion of “private own-
ership of the means of production” was one of his biggest 
blunders. Marx understood that in the feudal system, the 
rights to govern the people living on the land and the right 
to appropriate the fruits of their labor were all part and par-
cel of the “dominion” of the “Lord” of the land. As Frederic 
Maitland put it: “ownership blends with lordship, rulership, 
sovereignty in the vague medieval dominium,....” (Maitland, 
1960, p. 174) or in the words of Otto von Gierke: “Rulership 
and Ownership were blent” (Gierke, 1958, p. 58). But then 
Marx blundered by carrying over that notion with capital 
replacing land in the modern era.
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It is not because he is a leader of industry that a man is 
a capitalist; on the contrary, he is a leader of industry 
because he is a capitalist. The leadership of industry is 
an attribute of capital, just as in feudal times the func-
tions of general and judge were attributes of landed 
property. (Marx, 1977 (1867), p. 450-1)
Hence the title of Marx’s opus magnum and the very 
name of the system “capitalism.” The standard form of this 
conceptual mistake might be called the: 
Fundamental myth: that the legal rights to appropriate 
the product of production and the governance rights 
over the production process are part and parcel of 
(i.e., “an attribute of”) the “ownership of the means of 
production.”2 
This myth is one point of total agreement between 
Marxists and many “capitalist” thinkers—which is why 
Marxists have for some time functioned as ‘capitalist tools’ 
(Ellerman, Marxism as a Capitalist Tool, 2010). However, 
one of the most philosophically astute and careful defend-
ers of the current system, Frank Knight, pointed out that 
the Marxist label is a misnomer since capital can be rented 
out and the legal party undertaking a production process 
(Knight’s “entrepreneur”) might not actually own the capi-
tal goods or “means of production.”
Karl Marx, who in so many respects is more classi-
cal than the classicals themselves, had abundant his-
torical justification for calling, i.e., miscalling—the 
modern economic order “capitalism.” Ricardo and his 
followers certainly thought of the system as center-
ing around the employment and control of labor by 
the capitalist. In theory, this is of course diametrically 
wrong. The entrepreneur employs and directs both la-
bor and capital (the latter including land), and laborer 
and capitalist play the same passive role, over against 
the active one of the entrepreneur. It is true that en-
trepreneurship is not completely separable from the 
function of the capitalist, but neither is it completely 
separable from that of labor. The superficial observer 
is typically confused by the ambiguity of the concept 
of ownership. (Knight, 1956, p. 68)
However, Wright’s view of the “capitalist” system and 
even his view of worker cooperatives (!) is totally imbued 
with the fundamental myth. For instance, he sees the pri-
vate ownership of capital as including the:
rights to control the use and allocation of the surplus 
generated with the use of the means of production (i.e. 
the net income generated by the use of the means of 
production). (Wright, 2010, p. 75)
 The footnote on the same page includes:
The right to control the surplus generated through 
the use of means of production is very close to what 
economists refer to as “residual claimancy”—i.e. the 
right to all of the income generated in some economic 
process that remains after all expenses are paid. (2010, 
p. 75)
Or concerning the governance rights over workers, 
Wright also considers that as part of the rights of capital 
ownership:
At the core of the institution of private property is the 
power of owners to decide how their property is to be 
used. In the context of capitalist firms this is the basis 
for conferring authority on owners to direct the ac-
tions of their employees. (2010, p. 34) 
But the basic point is that in the misnamed “capitalist” 
economy, capital goods are just as rentable as people. If 
any legal party rents the necessary capital goods (perhaps 
from different capital owners) and buys the other inputs, 
then that party will be the residual claimant, even though 
the owners of the capital goods are still just that. Hence the 
residual claimant rights are not part and parcel of the own-
ership of capital goods. The residual claimancy role is a con-
tractual role, and one does not ‘own’ a contractual role in a 
market economy. 
There is a common confusion among both critics and 
defenders of market economies about what is in fact 
owned and what is determined by the pattern of market 
contracts—by who rents what or whom. For instance, a 
conventional corporation has owners (the common stock-
holders) and a corporation may own capital goods, but it is 
the pattern of market contracts that determines who is the 
‘firm’ in the sense of the going-concern business using that 
capital. And market contractual-patterns are not ‘owned’. 
This holds even when the owner of the capital is a corpora-
tion and the capital good is a whole factory. 
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For instance, after the merger of the Studebaker and 
Packard companies in the early 1950’s, the Studebaker-
Packard Corporation for a few years produced Packard 
car bodies in a plant leased from the Chrysler Corporation 
(Wikipedia). During that lease arrangement, Chrysler 
“owned the factory”, but it was neither the residual claimant 
nor the manager of the employees producing Packard car 
bodies in its factory due to the market contract leasing the 
factory to the Studebaker-Packard Corporation. The com-
mon phrase “ownership of the firm” is fundamentally con-
fused. The Chrysler shareholders “owned the firm” in the 
sense of the owning the Chrysler corporation, and the cor-
poration “owned the factory,” but Chrysler did not “own” 
the going-concern business using those “means of produc-
tion.” These simple points of conceptual clarity should not 
be hard for both critics and supporters of markets to under-
stand.3
This misunderstanding of the ownership of capital was 
no small mistake in Marx. It determined the whole focus of 
his theoretical efforts (e.g., the name and topic of his main 
work) and it lead to the disastrous call for the abolition of 
the “private ownership system” and to the general use of 
“private” as a swear word on much of the Left. The real dis-
tinctive feature of the current private enterprise system is 
the legal contract for the hiring, employing, or renting of 
human beings. 
Referring to the employment relation as the ‘renting’ of 
persons is not common usage but it is technically correct. 
In America, common usage is to “rent a car” and “hire a 
person” but in the UK, rental cars are called “hire cars.” 
Regardless of the language, it is the buying of the services 
provided by an entity as opposed to buying the entity it-
self. As the first American winner of the Economics Nobel 
Prize, Paul Samuelson, put it:
Since slavery was abolished, human earning power is 
forbidden by law to be capitalized. A man is not even 
free to sell himself: he must rent himself at a wage. 
(Samuelson, 1976, p. 52 (his italics))
Or as other neoclassical economists have put it:
Strictly speaking, the hourly wage is the rental pay-
ment that firms pay to hire an hour of labour. There 
is no asset price for the durable physical asset called a 
‘worker’ because modern societies do not allow slav-
ery, the institution by which firms actually own work-
ers. (Begg, Fischer, & Dornbusch, 1997, p. 201) 
Marxism has both in theory and in practice national-
ized rather than abolished the human rental system so 
that private employees become public employees instead of 
becoming the owner/members in firms such as worker co-
operatives where the people who work in a firm are jointly 
working for themselves renting or owning the necessary 
capital. This brings us to Wright’s treatment of worker co-
operatives.
ON THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A WORKER 
COOPERATIVE
Wright is so imbued with the fundamental myth that he 
even uses it to try to characterize worker cooperatives. The 
workers in a worker cooperative or self-managed firm (an 
older variant) are said to have the residual and governance 
rights because they are the owners of the means of produc-
tion. For instance, in the Jacobin article, Wright writes: 
In a worker-owned cooperative, all of the assets of the 
firms are jointly owned by the employees themselves, 
who also govern the firm in a one-person-one-vote, 
democratic manner. (12.2.2015)
In an essay written before (1979) workers’ self-manage-
ment had collapsed in Yugoslavia and when the younger 
Wright was more committed to using Marxist buzz-words 
to signal his membership in the “ideal speech community” 
(Gouldner) of Marxists, he put the same idea using that jar-
gon.
Workers’ self-management constitutes production 
in which the workers in a particular enterprise own 
the means of production and control the production 
process, and thus exercise rights over the disposi-
tion of the surplus produced by themselves within 
that enterprise. The mechanism of appropriation of 
the surplus labor can thus be designated “private-
collective self-appropriation.” The direct produc-
ers appropriate their own surplus labor, and they do 
so through a collective process of management and 
control over the production process. But this collec-
tive process remains essentially private in that the 
means of production are fully alienable and thus 
the surplus is appropriated by the workers in indi-
vidual enterprises rather than by the working class 
as a whole. The mechanism of appropriation thus 
contains within itself both capitalist and commu-
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nist elements: it is communist in that it is collec-
tive self appropriation rather than exploitation; it is 
capitalist in that it is private rather than social. (1994,  
p. 142)
In the book under review, he expresses essentially the 
same idea without all the Marxist jargon.
A stand-alone fully worker-owned cooperative firm 
in a capitalist economy is a form of social capitalism: 
the egalitarian principle of one-person one-vote of all 
members of the business means that the power rela-
tions within the firm are based on voluntary coopera-
tion and persuasion, not the relative economic power 
of different people. Jointly they control through dem-
ocratic means the economic power represented by the 
capital in the firm. (2010, p. 91)
Or:
At the other end of the spectrum are firms character-
ized by two principles: they are fully owned by their 
employees and they are democratically governed by 
their members on a one-person-one vote basis. Such 
firms are called worker cooperatives or producer co-
operatives. (2010, p. 167)
As an aside, it might be noted that in the American usage, 
“producer cooperatives” refers not to worker cooperatives 
but to agricultural marketing and processing ‘cooperatives’ 
(e.g., Land O’Lakes, Ocean Spray, Sunkist, etc.) which are 
completely conventional from the viewpoint of the employ-
ees and whose members are mostly agri-business corporate 
‘producers.’
Or again the same idea:
If they [the workers] were owners of the firm, for ex-
ample in the form of a worker-owned co-op, then their 
individual interests would be much more strongly 
aligned with those of the firm in which they worked, 
and fewer resources would have to be devoted to the 
tasks of social control. Since in general workers would 
work harder with less monitoring when they own the 
means of production, the heavy social control appara-
tus of capitalist production is a source of inefficiency. 
(2010, p. 41)
It is not difficult to conceptually separate being the re-
sidual claimant in a firm such as a worker cooperative from 
being the owner of the means of production. For instance, a 
family farm (as a one family worker cooperative) or an ag-
ricultural worker cooperative may well lease the land they 
work on, e.g., from a neighbor who can no longer work the 
land or from a land trust. 
Moreover, it is important, particularly for Marxists 
wielding capitalist notions of the “ownership of the firm,” to 
realize that there are other types of rights afoot than prop-
erty rights. The other major type of right, sometimes called 
“personal” or even “human” rights, are assigned to fulfilling 
a certain functional role—such as the voting rights attached 
to residing in a democratic living community. It makes no 
sense to treat these rights as alienable in a market transac-
tion since the buyer may not have the qualifying functional 
role, and if she or he did, then they would not need to buy 
the rights. The litmus test to differentiate property rights 
from personal rights is inheritability (or bequeathability). 
When you die, all your personal rights are extinguished but 
your property rights pass to your heirs.
The members of a worker cooperative do not get their 
membership rights (net income and self-governance rights) 
as part of the property rights such as “ownership of the 
means of production” or as “ownership of the firm.” Instead 
they are personal rights attached to the functional role of 
working in the firm—just as one’s municipal voting rights 
are attached to the functional role of residing in the mu-
nicipality. This has been spelled out quite clearly in the 
literature on worker cooperatives for at least 40 years, e.g., 
the pamphlet (ICA, 1978) published by the oldest organiza-
tion in the country devoted to worker co-ops, the Industrial 
Cooperative Association (now The ICA Group). The legal 
structure of a worker co-op has been spelled out repeatedly 
over the years, e.g., in the 1982 collection of essays called 
Workplace Democracy and Social Change (Ellerman, On the 
Legal Structure of Workers’ Cooperatives, 1982), or in the 
1984 collection of called Worker Cooperatives in America 
(Ellerman, Workers’ Cooperatives: The Question of Legal 
Structure, 1984) as well as in academic journals, e.g., 
(Ellerman, Theory of Legal Structure: Worker Cooperatives, 
1984) or (Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: 
The New Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 
1982-3), and in a host of other papers and books. It is not 
clear how anyone modestly familiar with the literature on 
worker co-ops has to fall back on the idea that the members 
of a worker co-op have the residual and governance rights 
because they “own the means of production.”
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If Marxists have trouble grasping the concept of having 
personal rights attached to the role of working in a worker 
cooperative, then it is best not to delve into the whole mat-
ter of the worker-members’ property rights in a worker co-
op in the form of internal capital accounts (or “divisible 
reserves”) (Ellerman, 2007) which were pioneered in the 
Mondragon cooperatives and were completely unmen-
tioned in Wright’s whole discussion of Mondragon. That is 
just too much complication for those thinking within the 
framing of who “owns the means of production.”
IS WRIGHT IN FAVOR OF WORKPLACE 
DEMOCRACY?
In his very definition of democracy, Wright uses what has 
been called the affected interests principle.
The second normative principle underlying the diag-
nosis and critique in this book concerns individual 
freedom and democracy. These two ideas are linked 
here because they both concern the power of people 
to make choices about things which affect their lives. 
This is the core principle: people should control as 
much as possible those decisions which affect their 
lives. 
“Freedom” is the power to make choices over one’s 
own life; “democracy” is the power to participate in 
the effective control of collective choices that affect 
one’s life as a member of the wider society. The demo-
cratic egalitarian principle of political justice is that all 
people should have equal access to the powers needed 
to make choices over their own lives and to participate 
in collective choices that affect them because of the 
society in which they live. (2010, p. 12)
This is the core reason why Wright is actually not in favor 
of workplace democracy at the firm level as in a worker co-
operative or democratic self-governing firm. Say, a worker 
co-op produces computers or cell phones that may be used 
all over the country or all over the world. Then all those us-
ers are “affected” by the potential decision by the worker 
co-op to raise prices or to change the design, so they are all 
“stakeholders” who need a “say” in the decision.
The term “stakeholders” is a contrast with the term 
“shareowners”. Share owners are the set of people with 
private property rights in the means of production. 
Stakeholders are all those with a “stake” in the means 
of production because their lives are affected by how 
those means of production are used. The idea that so-
cial ownership of specific means of production should 
extend to all stakeholders is the principle most consis-
tent with the normative ideals of radical democratic 
egalitarianism discussed in chapter 1. Recall that the 
democratic egalitarian principle of political justice is 
that all people should have equal access to the means 
necessary to participate in decisions which affect their 
lives as individuals and as members as communities. 
This corresponds to the expansive notion of social 
ownership in which all “stakeholders” have ownership 
rights. (2010, p. 77) 
Aside from characterizing (supposed) democratic rights 
as “ownership rights”, the point is the usual socialist one 
that “democratic control of the means of production and 
distribution” must involve potentially everyone or at least 
all the “stakeholders” in “society.” Thus, there can be no 
workplace democracy at the firm level—although “society” 
may delegate certain minor decisions to the workers in a 
firm in “democratic egalitarian socialism”. The expression 
“extending democratic rights to the workplace” has the 
usual socialist twist to mean not democracy in the work-
place but extending the reach of social-political democracy 
or “democratic social power” to include otherwise private 
workplaces.
What is the alternative definition of democracy? The usu-
al non-socialist definition of democracy is self-government 
of, by, and for those who are governed, not those who might 
just be affected. This uses the rather basic distinction be-
tween positive-direct-decision-making rights (e.g., within 
an organization) and negative-indirect-decision-constrain-
ing rights (e.g., in the marketplace). The rights of those who 
are only affected are usually enforced by their negative-in-
direct-decision-constraining rights such as their veto power 
in the marketplace (don’t buy the product!) or by consumer 
protection legislation in the overall political democracy. 
But socialists are driven by their goal to largely elimi-
nate the market so they disregard the usual indirect control 
rights exercised in the marketplace and thus have to extend 
“social democratic power” to include all workplaces. The 
suppliers of capital and other things to a productive firm, 
the buyers of the products, and the local residents are all not 
governed by the management of the firm. They are all only 
potentially affected by the decisions of the firm and thus 
should have effective indirect control rights through the 
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market or otherwise to protect their affected interests. That 
is the real import of the affected interests principle.
It might be noted that Robert Dahl also conceptualized 
democracy in terms of the affected interest principle and 
he also tended to buy the fundamental myth that control 
(and residual) rights are part of the “ownership of eco-
nomic enterprises” (Dahl, 1985, p. 62)—as noted in the re-
view (Ellerman, 1985) of his book A Preface to Economic 
Democracy. Wright quotes Dahl approvingly.
Robert Dahl has argued, in an important book on the 
meaning of democracy, that there is no logical reason 
why rights to private ownership confer rights to dicta-
torial power over employees. (2010, p. 34, fn. 15)
After noting that Dahl is against the fundamental myth 
as if it were a legal fact, Wright goes on to paraphrase a very 
different argument against the real legal source of the gov-
ernance rights over the workers, namely the human rental 
or employment contract.
Just as we have abolished slavery even in cases where 
a person might want to voluntarily enter into a con-
tract to be a slave on the grounds that people should 
not be allowed to permanently give up their rights to 
autonomy (or “self-ownership” as some philosophers 
call it), we could prohibit people from giving up their 
right to autonomy within the employment contract of 
capitalist firms. People could still invest in firms, but 
this would only give them rights to a stream of earn-
ings from the investment, not any rights to control 
the activities of people within the firm. [reference to 
(Dahl 1985)]. (Wright, 2010, p. 34, fn. 15)
An argument against a voluntary contract to give up 
one’s “right to autonomy within the employment contract” 
is normally called an inalienable rights argument. Prior to 
Marx, Hegel clearly spelled out the inalienable rights argu-
ment against allowing a person to “voluntarily enter into 
a contract to be a slave” in the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 
1967, p. Sec. 67) and that argument clearly also applied to 
the human rental contract—but it all sailed right by Marx. 
In fact, Marx went on to ridicule such arguments against 
the wage-labor contract itself by characterizing the sphere 
of exchange as the “very Eden of the innate rights of man” 
(Marx, 1977 (1867), p. Chap. VI) and Marxists have ever 
since only snickered at the very mention of inalienable 
rights. Hence Wright does not follow up on Dahl’s promis-
ing lead and instead, at least in his earlier and more intense 
Marxist phase, appealed to Marx’s labor theory of value and 
exploitation (Wright, 1994, p. 128)
Fortunately, Dahl’s use of the affected interests principle 
is innocent since he does not draw the usual socialist con-
clusion that all non-governmental firms (of any size) should 
fall under the political-social democratic governance. 
He ignores the socialist arguments when it comes to his 
“Sketch of an Alternative”. Instead Dahl comes out in fa-
vor of straightforward workplace democracy in the form of 
“worker’s cooperatives or examples of self-management or 
industrial democracy; but I prefer the term self-governing 
enterprises.” (Dahl, 1985, p. 91)4 
A LABOR THEORY OF ‘WHAT’?
In commenting on what is in a book like Envisioning Real 
Utopias, one might also note “some dogs that didn’t bark.” 
In addition to Marx’s misunderstanding the basic struc-
ture of legal rights in a “capitalist” private property market 
economy, Marx spent most of his massive theoretical efforts 
in developing the inchoate “labor theory” inherited from 
Locke, Smith, and particularly Ricardo into a labor theory 
of value and exploitation. This theory ended up being a ma-
jor train wreck in addition to being inherently superficial 
even if it had been a plausible theory of value. That is, as a 
theory of value it could at best only be a proof that wage-
labor was systematically underpaid. For instance, in Marx’s 
discussion of overtime work, he said that even if the labor 
during the normal work day was “paid for at its full value”, 
there would still be unpaid labor extracted in overtime. In 
his own words:
It will be seen later that the labour expended during 
the so-called normal day is paid below its value, so 
that the overtime is simply a capitalist trick to extort 
more surplus labour. In any case, this would remain 
true of overtime even if the labour-power expended 
during the normal working day were paid for at its 
full value. (Marx, 1977 (1867), p. 357; Chap. X, sec. 3)
While Marx was no doubt personally against the institu-
tion of wage-labor per se as evidenced by his “moralistic in-
vective,”5 his theory (even assuming it was valid) was only a 
theory trying to show that wage-labor is not “paid for at its 
full value.” In this respect, Marx can hold hands with neo-
classical economists who have their own equally superficial 
“bourgeois” wages-are-too-damn-low exploitation theory 
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that under non-competitive conditions, wage-labor is also 
not “paid for at its full value”, i.e., is not paid at the value 
of its marginal productivity (Ellerman, The Labour Theory 
of Property and Marginal Productivity Theory, 2016). Since 
the Marxian labor theory of value and exploitation was a 
train wreck as a theory of value and was in any case superfi-
cial—like its bourgeois brother—one wonders why so many 
Marxists have one of two reactions: 
1. cling to the labor theory of value and exploitation as 
one’s ‘badge of Red courage’ to signal membership in 
the dwindling band of Marxists, or 
2. just drop it altogether without understanding that 
there was another labor theory that might be valid.
John Locke, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo bequeathed 
to the 1800s an inchoate set of ideas which might be called 
“the labor theory” based somehow on the special status of 
human labor among the other factors of production. Those 
who saw their social role as finding a ‘scientific’ apology for 
“the system” needed to find some alternative theory where 
human labor would play no distinguished role. That was 
only accomplished towards the end of that century with 
marginal productivity theory as part of the whole mar-
ginalist revolution. But the critics of “the system” tried to 
develop the labor theory as a criticism of the system. Marx 
made the crucial decision to develop “the labor theory” as 
a labor theory of value and exploitation—and to target the 
system as “the capitalist system.” But that was not the only 
way to develop that inchoate set of ideas nor the only way to 
identify the system. 
The alternative path was to develop it as the labor or 
natural rights theory of property, e.g., (Schlatter, 1951), 
and to identify “the system” as the human rental system. 
That was essentially the path taken by the small band of 
political economists sometimes called “Ricardian social-
ists” although they were neither. Some of the principals 
in the school were Thomas Hodgskin and Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon.
There are many Marxists who have taken second option 
of wisely dropping the labor theory of value and exploita-
tion, and thus who have to get their Marxist membership 
ticket punched on the basis of some other theory like his-
torical materialism, crisis theory, class analysis, or just a 
postmodernist word-cloud of the right buzz-words. What 
I at first found puzzling was why they didn’t cross over to 
the labor theory of property? That theory delivers a critique 
of the institution of wage-labor per se and is independent of 
any theory of value or wage rates. In the vernacular, Marx 
‘brought a knife to a gun fight’, i.e., he brought a value the-
ory to a property theory fight, so, of course, he lost out even 
if it had been a plausible value theory. 
But how is a Marxist to find that alternative labor theory? 
It is not in Marx as some true-blue Marxists have testified. 
None of this, by the way, implies that Marx intend-
ed the labor theory of value as a theory of property 
Figure 1: The fork in “the labor theory” road
The 
‘Labor
Theory’
The Labor Theory  
of Property
The Labor Theory  
of Value
Karl Marx
‘Ricardian Socialists’
Thomas Hodgskin
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
Modern LTP = 
“Labor's Right to  
The Whole Product”
Dustbin of  
Intellectual  
History
John Locke
Adam Smith
David Ricardo
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rights, a la Locke or even Proudhon. (Shaikh, 1977,  
p. 121)
Marxists might discover the alternative “labor theory” 
by at least reading the titles of the other labor theory books 
such as:
• Proudhon’s main book, What is Property? (Proudhon, 
1970 (1840)),
• Hodgskin’s book, The Natural and Artificial Right of 
Property Contrasted (Hodgskin, 1973 (1832)), or
• Anton Menger’s book about the core tenet of that school, 
The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour: The Origin and 
Development of the Theory of Labour’s Claim to the Whole 
Product of Industry (Menger, 1970 (1899)).
That is, in the labor theory of ‘what?’, the alternative 
‘what’ is property.
But Marxists cannot adopt the labor theory of property 
because it is the normative basis for private property (“get-
ting the fruits of your labor”). Marxists are dedicated to the 
“abolition of private property” (for the fallacious reasons 
outlined above concerning the fundamental myth)—as 
well as to the “social appropriation” of the product of in-
dustry. In short, Marxists are inherently against the people 
working in each enterprise privately and jointly appropri-
ating the positive and negative fruits of their labor. Hence 
Marxists are not going to drop the labor theory of value in 
favor of the labor theory of property. 
An interesting case of a potential crossover Marxist is 
the late G. A. Cohen. Cohen was one of the founding and 
leading members of the Analytical Marxism group which 
includes Wright and seems to be his main reference group; 
see the Prologue in (Wright, 1994). At some point, Cohen 
had the brainstorm that the core critique actually had noth-
ing to do with value! 
And it is this fairly obvious truth which, I contend, 
lies at the heart of the Marxist charge of exploitation. 
The real basis of that charge is not that workers pro-
duce value, but that they produce what has it. (Cohen, 
1981, p. 219)
One would think it might occur to Cohen at this point 
that if the “fairly obvious truth” is not about value, then 
the “labour theory” might really be the “labour theory” of 
something else. But Cohen was not able to find that other 
labor theory—which, in any case, would not deliver the sine 
qua non of Marxist socialism, the “social” appropriation of 
the product of industry. Hence Cohen goes on to argue that 
all the inputs are “socially produced” and thus appropria-
tion must take place at the “social” level. 
It is a shame that Cohen did not understand that the 
direct implication of his “fairly obvious truth” is that the 
inputs in one enterprise are what the workers produce in a 
supplier enterprise. For instance, the drill presses used to 
produce the product in one enterprise are the products pro-
duced not by “society” but by the people working in a drill 
press enterprise. And the appropriate notion of “product” 
that the people in an enterprise produce is the whole prod-
uct (i.e., the production vector of output-assets and input-li-
abilities) which includes not only the output-assets but also 
the liabilities for the inputs they use up, e.g., the liabilities 
for using up the services of the drill presses to be satisfied 
by buying or leasing the drill presses. 
By the labor theory of property, the people who work in 
one enterprise should:
 
• jointly own the assets they produce as outputs, and
• jointly owe the liabilities they also create by using up the 
inputs. 
Those liabilities would be satisfied by buying the neces-
sary inputs from the supplier firms. But that would typi-
cally be a market transaction—which is another reason 
why this whole train of thought is not available to someone 
whose pre-analytical predilection is abolishing market re-
lationships.
The non-development of the labor theory of property and 
the condemnation of the “private property system” is per-
haps the greatest gift of Marxism to the professional apol-
ogists for the human rental system. That is why Marxism 
now functions as a capitalist tool.6 The human rental system 
gives the people (“employees”) working in each firm: 
• zero percent of their negative product (the liabilities for 
using use the inputs), and 
• zero percent of the positive product (the assets produced 
as outputs).
That is, it gives them zero percent of the whole product 
(positive + negative product). Instead of the Marxist (and 
conventional) picture of the workers getting part of the 
product with the employer appropriating the “surplus prod-
uct,” the legal facts are that the employer appropriates the 
whole product (all the produced outputs and all the liabili-
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ties for the inputs) and the workers none. As an economic 
sociologist, Wright should appreciate the accurate state-
ment of the legal facts by another sociologist in the early 
20th century.
The laborer at no time owns any part of what is pass-
ing through his hands or under his eye. Never can he 
say, “This product, when finished, will be mine, and 
my rewards will depend on how successfully I can dis-
pose of it.” There is much theoretic discussion to the 
“right of labor to the whole product” and much query-
ing as to how much of the product belongs to the la-
borer. These questions never bother the manufacturer 
or his employee. They both know that, in actual fact, 
all of the product belongs to the capitalist, and none 
to the laborer. The latter has sold his labor, and has a 
right to the stipulated payment therefor. His claims 
stop there. He has no more ground for assuming a 
part owner-ship in the product than has the man who 
sold the raw materials, or the land on which the fac-
tory stands. (Fairchild, 1916, p. 65-6) 
Instead, the employees are treated as suppliers of the 
commodity labor, and thus as the party to whom the labor 
liability (the labor costs) is owed. That liability and the oth-
er input-liabilities are paid off by the employer, who is thus 
the residual claimant.
 By being against “the private property system” and by 
eschewing the whole labor theory of property as the only 
legitimate basis for private property, Marxism has delivered 
a priceless gift to the apologists for the human rental sys-
tem. The apologists can pose as the defenders of “the private 
property system” –when in fact the human rental system is 
directly based on denying rented people (“employees”) the 
appropriation of the positive and negative fruits of their la-
bor.
As for the dogs that didn’t bark in the case at hand, 
Wright in this book and elsewhere in his writings studi-
ously eschews any of the “bourgeois” language or concepts 
of the labor theory of property (e.g., getting the fruits of 
your labor or, in juridical terms, imputing the positive and 
negative legal responsibility for the results of production 
to those who are de facto responsible for producing those 
results) from the whole discussion and critique of the cur-
rent system. Instead Wright espouses the collective or social 
appropriation by “the working class as a whole” or, in this 
book, by a vague mélange of “social associations.” In either 
case, from the history of real-existing Marxist socialism in 
the 20th century, one does not have to wonder what institu-
tion would end up doing the actual “social” appropriation.
In conclusion, we might quote the genuinely radi-
cal proposals of the democratic classical liberal and 
yet Conservative MP (who was dubbed “Minister for 
Thought”), Lord Eustace Percy, who remarked when con-
sidering the post-WWII reconstruction:
Here is the most urgent challenge to political inven-
tion ever offered to the jurist and the statesman. The 
human association which in fact produces and dis-
tributes wealth, the association of workmen, manag-
ers, technicians and directors, is not an association 
recognised by the law. The association which the law 
does recognise—the association of shareholders, cred-
itors and directors—is incapable of production and is 
not expected by the law to perform these functions. 
We have to give law to the real association, and to 
withdraw meaningless privilege from the imaginary 
one. (Percy, 1944, p. 38)
NOTES
1 It is often said the Marx did not elaborate on his vision 
of an ideal society. But when one condemns “the sys-
tem” because it has X (e.g., X = private ownership of 
capital or X = market relations), then one has clearly 
stated that one’s ideal at least does not have X.
2 This is a statement about legal rights, not about “so-
cial power” which, everyone knows, is typically in the 
hands of the employer/capital-owner.
3 The attempt to clarify Marxian thinking about 
the structure of legal rights is usually met with the 
Foucauldian response: “How can you be so superficial 
to worry about legal rights? It is all just congealed pow-
er relations.”
4 And Dahl footnotes a non-socialist source: “In clari-
fying my ideas on this question I have profited great-
ly from a number of unpublished papers by David 
Ellerman, cited in the bibliography, ... .” (Dahl 1985, p. 
91, fn. 1)
5 Albert O. Hirschman’s verdict was that Marx’s “works 
exhibit a simple juxtaposition of scientific apparatus 
and moralistic invective, wholly unversöhnt” [i.e., un-
resolved] quoted in: (Adelman 2013, p. 570).
6 For instance, when conventional economists want to 
“take on the opposition,” they typically search out the 
REVIEW ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS BY ERIK OLIN WRIGHT
103
COSMOS + TAXIS
CO
SM
O
S 
+ 
TA
X
IS
 
nearest Marxist to lecture on the deficiencies of the la-
bor theory of value. A perfect example of this genre is 
Robert Solow’s scolding of Marxist Duncan Foley in 
(Solow, 2006).
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